value better, which is to say, more consistently and rationally. And this is a kind of value progress as well.
I will call changes that implicate values "transformations," and my interest is in the subset of those changes that are the work of the person herself, which I will call "selftransformations." I will, in turn, want to further subdivide the category of selftransformation, but before doing so let me say a word about the first two distinctions.
(a) valuing
What is it to value something? Like Niko Kolodny ii , Samuel Scheffler iii and Jay Wallace iv , I deny that valuing is identical to the attitude of believing something to be valuable. As Scheffler observes, our capacity to believe that things are valuable far outstrips our capacity for personally investing ourselves in those objects we can truly be said to value v . Most of us believe that, for instance, early childhood education, public transportation, or opera are valuable. A person who values one of these things will also tend to display certain characteristic actions and feelings in relation to the object of value.
Nor do action and feeling suffice for valuing. It is possible to be emotionally vulnerable to, and disposed to protect or engage with, something one thinks badly of, and wishes one did not care about. When I value something, by contrast, I approve of my own affective entanglement with it. Scheffler articulates four components of valuing. I paraphrase them as follows:
(1) Cognitive: A belief that the object is good.
(2) Affective: An emotional sensitivity in relation to the object.
(3) Motivational: A disposition to see the object as giving rise to practical reasons.
(4) Reflexive: A tendency to experience (1)-(3) as warranted vi .
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When I value something, I both care about it and take it to be worth caring about. Valued objects mean something to the person who values them. The role the object plays in the person's life is reflected in the set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing attitudes vii described by Scheffler. It is useful to invoke the framework of value, as opposed to merely that of desire, or belief, or emotion, because when those attitudes are bound together in a value they are also more reliably bound up with who someone is. I may have a stray attitude that doesn't reflect "the real me," but I cannot thus claim alienation from the beliefs, desires and feelings that form part of the nexus that is my valuing of
something. The fact that I have values means that my attitudes 'clump' together into
units that reflect what, as we say, I am all about.
Because my values pick out those things that really matter to me, they serve as a rational springboard for how I ought to act, think and feel. In the most familiar case, the fact that I value something gives rise to a reason to engage with that object. So, for example, if my mother makes an expedition to Bayreuth at great personal expense, this trip is rationalized by my the fact that she values opera. I, by contrast, merely believe that opera is valuable. Given that opera does not matter much to me, those who know me would be mystified to discover that I went all the way to Germany to listen to it.
Valuing also serves as rational ground for self-correction: a person decides that, given how much he values public transportation, he should be less irritated than he is with the minor inconveniences of bus travel; someone resolves, on the basis of her valuation of early childhood education, to volunteer more regularly at her local Head Start. These decisions presuppose already valuing the objects in questions, and are distinct from any process by which a person comes to value them (i.e., to come to believe that they are valuable, and to acquire the relevant emotional, motivational and reflexive tendencies).
Thus we can draw a distinction between the set of attitudes and dispositions that constitute someone's valuation of, e.g., opera, public transportation, early childhood education, and the set of attitudes and dispositions she is rationally required to have as a result of having those values. One way to change in value would be to consolidate a value-nexus one already has by honoring the entailments of one's current values, while another way is to acquire some whole novel nexus of value. In short, one can change both from or on the basis of value, and towards or in order to acquire value. The difference between these two forms of value-change will play a big role in the discussion to follow.
There is, of course, a distinction to be drawn between value-change and progress in respect of value. For there are degenerative changes. In what follows I will simply be assuming that all of the changes under discussion are changes for the better.
(Elsewhere viii , I argue the central distinction of this paper can be articulated only in relation to progressive changes.) (b) changing oneself vs. being changed 6 Sometimes, a change that a person undergoes is the intended result of something that she does: she changes herself. So, for instance, she has her hair cut because she thinks it will look better that way; another person starts exercising, because he wants to be healthier; yet another cultivates a particular accent, because she thinks it will make her sound sophisticated. Someone becomes a vegetarian, because he thinks eating meat is unethical; someone else stops being a vegetarian, because she judges that not eating meat is unethical. In these cases, the changes to the agent happen as part of her own deliberate attempt to shape what kind of person she is. She acts on herself. These same kinds of changes can occur in a more passive way: her friends pull a prank on her and cut her hair while she's sleeping; he stops eating meat because it becomes unavailable; she finds herself losing her accent over the course of years abroad; he starts exercising less and less each day, without realizing his habits are changing. These people cannot explain the advent of their new condition by casting it as a response to reasons to be in that condition.
In these examples, it is easy to distinguish between whether the change in a person is a product of her agency or instead something she underwent as a passive subject. Some cases will be harder: consider the person who cuts off her hair in a burst of anger; or the one who starts exercising under the influence of peer pressure; or the one who stops eating meat from growing distaste. Without offering an analysis of these more obscure cases, I will say that I follow Joseph Raz's ix (1997) 
III. Aspiration
In my early twenties, I entered a PhD program in Classics at Berkeley. Classicists are proficient translators of Greek and Latin; they produce interpretations of these texts that shape the way other people go on to read them; and they teach students to read Latin and Generation after generation of scribes had, as I saw it, copied those manuscripts for me, so that I could eventually read them. And this gratitude gave rise to a sense of responsibility: I too was a kind of scribe, tasked with keeping these texts available to and relevant for a new generation. This was the way in which the value of becoming a classicist began to reveal itself to me. Let me offer a few more examples to flesh out the categories of self-cultivation and aspiration, since the claim that these are two real but importantly distinct forms of selftransformation is the argumentative backbone of this paper. One common form that selfcultivation takes is an agent noticing in herself problematic or self-destructive qualities:
IV Aspiration vs. Self-cultivation
she spends too much money; she overeats; she habitually levels casual insults at her inlaws; she procrastinates. Recognizing these facts about herself, and that they are in tension with her central values, she might set out to change them. She develops a distaste for procrastination instead of seeing it as a charming peccadillo; she starts taking pride in her expertise about internet blocking software. She might also set out to acquire projects, habits, skills or desires. A larger vocabulary will help her get through translation exercises faster; regular jogging will increase her energy levels; pet-ownership will help combat depression; calling her mother and best friend once a week will keep those relationships in better order; cultivating pleasant relations with her in-laws will make everyone's lives run more smoothly.
The essential feature of self-cultivation is that, though the change itself may take time, the self-cultivator can see in advance just what is to be gained by it. This is because she already has whatever value the change serves. She isn't changing in that respect. The self-cultivator can step back from the way she currently is, reflect on what she wants out of life, and make an informed choice about how to change. The fact that she doesn't take pleasure in exercise or know how to speed-read doesn't keep her from understanding exactly what would be good about doing so.
Aspirational pursuits, by contrast, feature agents who must be more tentative, because they are less sure that they know what they are getting themselves into. Consider two stylized examples. Bill has never been a fan of classical music, but at some point he starts to open himself up to it: he takes a music appreciation class, he listens to one piece every night before going to bed, he buys an annual subscription to the symphony. His immersion in classical music neither supports his other pursuits, nor is entailed by his other values. He doesn't think that by coming to appreciate music he will be less stressed out at work, or that it will help him curry favor or appear sophisticated. In fact, the classes and tickets and equipment take time, energy and money away from the set of projects he was pursuing. He could say that his efforts are directed at the intrinsic value of music, but his words will have a hollow ring. For he does not yet appreciate this value.
Sheila, who has been single for a long time, decides to start dating. She makes an effort to, as they say, put herself out there. She does not do this because she finds herself unable to occupy her evenings, or because she finds her work unfulfilling; she does not take the plot of her life to call for someone in the role of partner. Her life is, on its own terms, complete. But she has the sense that those terms might themselves be a bit narrow, and an inchoate understanding of a form of value that is out there for her to discover and enjoy. Her romantic project does not promote what she already valued 13 anyway. She orients herself towards a new value, and one she seeks to acquire for its own sake-not because it will serve something she valued before. If asked, she'd have to admit that she's not sure what she has to gain.
The self-cultivator sees the changes she is enacting in herself as entailed by the fixed value-condition she is already in. Her 'change' therefore amounts to a consolidation of the self she already has. The aspirant, by contrast, sets out to acquire a way of being that need not serve, and may well clash with, her pre-existing values. Given the intimate connection between what a person values and who she is, we can say she is in search of a new self. We can also articulate the difference with reference to the values contained in the new condition. The aspirant sets out to acquire new beliefs, desires, emotions etc. for their own sakes, i.e., for the sake of the value that is comprised of those attitudes, whereas the self-cultivator sets out to acquire them because she sees them as serving her antecedently fixed valuational condition.
V. The Possibility of Aspiration?
In cases of self-cultivation, I encounter some opportunity to incorporate some new area of agency into a standing value nexus. Even if they do not explicitly articulate the position, many philosophers are committed to thinking that the only alternative to this form of selfchange is being changed. They assume that unless someone can derive an attitudinal change from the values she already has, the change cannot be rational.
14 In my book Aspiration I articulate three areas of ethics in which the temptation to exclude the very possibility of aspiration manifests itself: decision theory, moral psychology, and the theory of moral responsibility. Let me briefly summarize the first, so as to give the reader a sense of how the topic of aspiration fits into the existing philosophical literature.
In the decision-theoretic literature, we find agents described not in terms of values but in terms of preferences. So we can say that the aspirant and the self-cultivator are both on their way to acquiring new preferences, but the latter is distinguished by the fact that she currently has a full-fledged preference to have those new preferences. The aspirant won't know exactly what preferences she is acquiring or exactly why those are good preferences to have; and if, as often occurs, her aspirational activity results in a change to her core preferences, it will not usually be the best way to maximize the satisfaction of her standing (antecedent) preferences. How, then, can it be rational?
Edna Ullmann-Margalit xi thinks that it cannot. She argues that an agent who must decide whether to engage in some activity which will foreseeably alter her core preferencessuch as having a child, getting married, or emigrating from one's homeland-faces a choice that "straddles two discontinuous personalities with two different rationality It might seem, then, that we can make no progress with examples until we carefully unpack the assumptions underwriting the interlocutor's unwillingness to admit of a third way. But I think that is not the case, because examples are not all made equal. In the remainder of this paper, I will discuss an example that is especially resistant to the reinterpretative gambit, because it is in a certain sense paradigmatically aspirational:
liberal arts education. I will show that if we take ourselves to be forced to choose between modeling college education as passive and modeling it as self-cultivation, we will introduce a recognizable distortion of the phenomenon.
VI. The Parental Model
What are college students after? What do they hope to get out of the classes they take from philosophers such as myself, or from my colleagues in English, history, mathematics, etc.? Consider two models that we might apply to students' engagement with the value of the education they receive in college. It is striking that Brighouse portrays teachers and parents as the ones who "use the time" that students spend in school. Are such students passive recipients of their education?
Children must show up to class, participate in discussions, complete assignments, etc.
else they will get no benefit from the time spent in school. In defense of Brighouse, we can point out that a student may be motivated to act in ways conducive to her acquiring an education not because she understands the value of doing so, but partly by authority (students trust and respect their teachers) partly by compulsion (students must attend school) partly from enjoyment (well-designed assignments can be pleasant) and partly by reward (parents and teachers find ways to associate positive outcomes with academic success). On the parental model, the students themselves don't need to understand the values they are to acquire; that understanding has been delegated to the parents, teachers, If education is to outstrip childhood, we need a non-parental model for the later stretches of the educational process. Which is to say, we need a model where the agent herself is at the helm of the educational process by which she changes. For only a non-parental model will pay proper respect to the student as someone whose place it is to govern her 19 own acquisition of knowledge, desires, interests, habits, and, most importantly, values.
She may do a poor job of it, at least at first, but it is not a job anyone can do for her.
VII. The Consumer Model
An alternative model, one to which a young adult may herself be drawn xvii , is to think of herself as a consumer in relation to her education. Our students do, after all, 'shop' for classes which, if they take, they can go on to review; these reviews are sometimes accessible online, presumably to assist others who are trying to determine whether to make the same 'purchase.' And these students, or their parents, have indeed paid a high price for the courses they take from us. Given that they often go deep into debt in the process, it is not unintelligible that they should demand to get their money's worth.
The problem with the consumer model is that it presupposes that students enter college already in possession of exactly what they attend college to get. Consider what makes someone an ideal or excellent consumer: such a person does not go to the supermarket for milk and come home with magazines; she buys a car for its automotive properties, and because of how it looks or what her neighbors think xviii ; she has done her research, and she is also self-informed-she must know her own needs and desires in order to gauge which purchases would serve her well. She enters the store armed with a schema that her purchase must fit, and she will not spend money until she can be fairly certain, in advance, that she has lit upon something that satisfies this schema. give students access to a distinct domain of aesthetic, scientific or literary value. We aren't selling them something they already want; instead, we are tying to help them learn to want something, or to strengthen and deepen a pre-existing but weak desire. We teach them to demand more, of life and of themselves, than they would otherwise have done.
We help them see what is out there on offer, and what they themselves want and need.
As a result, they (hopefully) become informed consumers. And this suggests that they cannot already be informed consumers when we first meet them. If they are uninformed, we should not treat them as consumers at all-for they will buy the wrong things. Must we, then revert to the parental model, and treat them as children who are not in a position to govern their own choices and actions? I believe there is a third option.
VIII. Students as Aspirants
Recall the distinction between those changes that are wrought by the agent herself, and those that are products of environmental influences. The parental model suggests that 21 education belongs in the latter category: the student is passive in relation to the change of becoming educated. On the consumer model, students are active in the mode of selfcultivation: they are in school because they recognize just what is to be gained from each educational choice. The suggestion I want to make is that the right model for higher education is the aspirational model. What the possibility of aspiration reveals is that there is some space between a condition in which other people are rightly in charge of your agency and development, and a condition in which you know what's good for you.
For the aspirant, learning what is good for herself is her own work.
The concept of aspiration gives us a way of modeling the work we do in helping our students as something other than a form of service to needs that are fully independent of that work. Aspirants are characteristically needy and vulnerable, because they are guided by a sense of value on which they have only a tenuous grip. They reach out for mentors, not because they want to farm out the activity of grasping the value of their own pursuits to someone else, but because they cannot do it alone. The aspirant feels, all the time, that her grip on the value of what she is doing is tenuous. She is hungry for more, self-critical, vulnerable to others' assessments as to whether she is getting it right. At the same time she strives to free herself from needing their help, from caring what they think of her.
Her vulnerability should not be confused with childishness: it calls for a courageous selfawareness of weakness that marks adulthood. She hasn't committed to turning her life in some pre-approved direction. She is expending considerable resources stretching herself hopefully towards something she grasps only through a glass darkly, all too aware of the danger that she may be left empty-handed.
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Though they know that they do not know, our students also insist that the meaning of what they are learning is theirs to discover. They are not and should not be willing to entrust to us the project of becoming someone new. If we see them as aspirants, we can see how much they need our help, while at the same time recognizing that the form of help they are seeking is compatible with respecting them as self-shaping adults.
Some years after graduating from college, I asked the best teacher I ever had why she stopped teaching the course I first took with her. She said that she stops teaching a book when she feels she knows it too well to be curious about what other people have to say about it. That response helped me to understand why the experience of being her student was, above all, the experience of being listened to, as though I were a font of answers to life's great questions. She would stare intently at me while I spoke, and often her reply would take the form of a two word command: "Another sentence." My first reaction was always panic. I would think to myself, I've said all I had to say. To my own surprise, the words would come, I would draw out the sentence that I didn't know was in me. It would have been unthinkable to demand that her class serve any desire or need I had before I entered it; but I also couldn't see her as an authority figure, not when she was taking what I said so seriously. She wasn't forcing or even suggesting that I become anything; she was somehow enabling me to hold myself up to the set of standards that I was just beginning to recognize as my own. I would not be the person that I am without her. But she did not make me who I am. Though our teachers may draw it out from us, that next sentence expresses our thought and not theirs.
IX. Pure Aspiration?
There is an important difference between the examples of aspiration with which I began-my pursuit of classics, Sheila's foray into dating, Bill's quest to appreciate classical music-and the case I have leveraged those examples to analyze. Though Sheila and Bill and I did not begin our aspirational journey with a full grasp of the value we sought to come to appreciate, we would have been able to say from the start what value we were hunting. The processes by which the three of us came to arrive at or near our goals have the rational structure they do because we directed them, from the outset, at some definite target: Classics, romance, music. I may not have known the value of classics, but I did know that it was the value of classics that I was after. If my target had radically shifted, say from classics to music, or from music to romance, it would not have seemed right to describe me as engaged in an aspirational project. The agent who shifts from classics to romance to music seems to be drifting rather than working to make systematic progress along an aspirational trajectory. And the agent who is trying to "find herself" without having any sense of whether she is trying to find a self interested in classics, romance or music seems to be flailing rather than aspiring.
The problem is that the college experience is characterized by just such shifting and uncertainty. In the good case, students leave college with a deeper grasp of some intrinsic value(s) than they had at the outset. As a result of their time in college, something matters to them that didn't matter to them as much, or at all, before. But did they go off to college in order to come into contact with those very values? In many 24 cases, no. I endeavor to bring it about that my students leave college with some appreciation for and interest in philosophy-but many of them had not even heard of the subject before entering college. A fortiori, they didn't come to college in order to study it. And even in cases where the student did enter with the relevant passion, they often enter with many such passions, and little, or a mistaken, view as to which they will end up deepening. were much closer to one another, the switch meant that I left a program training me to become a classicist and entered one that trained me to become a philosopher. Graduate education does not have the flexibility to accommodate such shifts in one's aspirational target. Undergraduate education, by contrast, can allow for shifts away from the academic domain altogether, into theater or activism or sports; even time spent working through romantic entanglements can be a profitable element of the college journey. An event that would mark the termination of the graduate student's (or romance seeker's, or would-be music lover's) aspiration is but a shift within the career of the undergraduate's.
A. Bartlett Giamatti's xx address to the incoming class at Yale beautifully captures this peculiar condition of aspirational uncertainty:
All summer long… you have simply wanted to get on with it. There, of course, is the rub. Despite all you have heard and read, no one can tell you what it is you are now so desirous of getting on with. Nor can anyone tell you what it, whatever it is, will be like. You wonder, Will everyone else know? Will he or she be more sure, less insecure, less new? Will I ever get to know anyone? Will I be able to do it? Whatever it is.
[.…]
I cannot tell you with certainty what it will be like; no one can. Each of us experiences college differently. I can assure you that soon your normal anxieties will recede and a genuine excitement will begin, a rousing motion of the spirit unlike anything you have experienced before. And that will mark the beginning of it, the grand adventure that you now undertake, never alone but on your own, the voyage of exploration in freedom that is the development of your own mind. Generations have preceded you in this splendid opening out of the self as you use the mind to explore the mind, and, if the human race is rational, generations will come after you. But each of you will experience your education uniquely-charting and ordering and dwelling in the land of your own intellect and sensibility, discovering powers you had only dreamed of and mysteries you had not imagined and reaches you had not thought that thought could reach. (118) (119) Giamatti's description may strike some as pious and high-minded; to others, it may be a reminder of the privilege experienced by the very few undergrads who are in a position to attend elite institutions such as Yale. To me, it rings true, at least as a description of my better moments as a student and a teacher; and I readily grant that one should be grateful to have teachers and students that afford one even so much as glimpse into such a Recall Bill. He becomes someone who loves music, and he takes a musical journey, and he learns to think about music. In the case of the college student attending Giamatti's lecture, we may well be unable to fill in the corresponding blanks. We regularly describe college as a place where people learn how to think (about what?) or a place of personal development (into what?) or as an intellectual journey (whither?). This is, to adapt a line of thought from David Velleman, like saying that if college were a game, its goal would be winning; or that if it were a hunt, its goal would be the quarry; or that if college were a question, its goal would be to find the answer xxi . Velleman insists that an activitydescription that invokes only such a formal or generic object is incomplete, or in Velleman's phrase, not "fully constituted". xxii Just as Velleman would correct the gameplayer who says her goal is winning-"that's the goal of every game, what's the goal of this one?"-he would have to correct the description of the college student as becoming someone or acquiring new values or learning how to think. He would demand that we supply the more specific goal and value by which to assess her aspirational success.
Velleman's demand is not unreasonable. If her aspirations get her anywhere, she does end up having satisfied a far more specific goal than that of value-acquisition in general.
But that goal needn't be one she could articulate at the outset. We must distinguish between an activity-description that is incomplete because it adopts too general a level of description ("What are you doing?" "Something"), and one that is incomplete because it describes only the beginning of a long process. If we fail to make this distinction, we will think that incompleteness always calls for a more specific description, as opposed to calling for us take in a longer swath of the phenomenon. Which is to say, it is possible that our description is incomplete because the thing we are describing has not been completed. Some forms of agency are not homogeneous in their rational structure;
instead of having the structure of a game governed by a determinate set of rules throughout the course of play, they have the structure of a blurry image gradually coming into view. The college student will be able to produce a description that satisfies Velleman; but she may not be able to do so yet.
Consider the poetic last line quoted above: "reaches you had not thought that thought could reach." Giamatti envisions a project where one could not have foreseen in advance the very existence of the developmental steps that one ends up taking, a voyage into territory that seems to materialize as one advances into it. This line captures the impotence of a motive such as 'curiosity' to fuel the sort of exploration Giamatti has in
mind. An appetite for learning is bounded by a person's conception of what there is to be learned, and it is this conception, as much as anything, that is subject to revision, emendation, improvement. To "use the mind to explore the mind" involves using the mind to disturb, goad, and provoke the mind into wanting to know something, the knowledge of which will goad it into wanting more. It is hard work to learn to ask the questions of the physicist, the philosopher, the anthropologist. Those teachers do not simply provide answers to questions with which their students happen to approach them; one doesn't study any of these subjects because one is "just curious." Seeing one's way to the questions of physics or philosophy is itself an achievement within physics and philosophy xxiii .
We will lose our sense of what is happening with our students if we re-interpret what they are doing by way of a description that applies, homogeneously, throughout the process.
It is true college that students are curious. It is also true that argumentative training fortifies a mind against deceptive political and commercial rhetoric, fitting one for democratic citizenship; college writing and classroom discussion gives a person lifelong training in articulating, and therefore also having, her own views; employers of many kinds are eager to hire liberal arts graduates xxiv . College may, indeed, help you do whatever you happen to want to do next-but it is infelicitous to describe college students as engaged in the project of furthering whatever ends they might later acquire.
No undergraduate ever wrote a great paper on Descartes solely with a view to acquiring skills she might later apply in her political career-even if it is true that by writing the paper she was thereby acquiring those skills. If we were assuming the parental model, we could separate the question of how the student conceives of what she is doing from the question of the kind of education she is receiving. But, as I've been insisting, college 29 students are too old to have their learning governed by anyone's else's conception of its value.
The problem with portraying college as a rational skills factory is not only that the education has an intrinsic value that we ignore by instrumentalizing it as skill-acquisition;
it's that the very acquisition of those skills seems predicated on not taking skillacquisition as one's goal. Our students approach Descartes or painting or psychology in a meticulous rational spirit because they have learned, and are learning, to come to care Velleman is right that if all we are doing is "doing something" or "becoming someone" then we are not doing anything at all. But there is an important difference between the question of whether someone is to be described in this objectionably "formal" or "generic" way in virtue of the beginning of the process or the end. Suppose a suit-maker cuts and tailors his suits to fit any figure. What drives Bill, Sheila, and the college student is not the appreciation of those values they already have, but the prospect of the (true, complete) appreciation they can see they lack.
But its purity also makes this particular form of aspiration especially puzzling. How can someone pursue the project of becoming someone when she has no (or wrong) ideas about who she wants to become? The answer, in this case, seems to be the existence of a special kind of institution. There do seem to be some unique features of the institutions that sustain such aspiration, for instance:
31
(1) They offer students the opportunity to learn just about anything they might end up wanting to learn. I could have become a classicist at a university without a physics department, but I wouldn't have become an undergraduate classics major at such a place.
For I came to classics through physics.
(2) They offer students extra-academic opportunities for engagement with sports, drama, journalism, religion, political activism.
(3) They offer opportunities for friendship and romance.
(4) They present all these varied forms of value to students who are not yet expected to have any expertise in them. Moreover, those students are at some leisure to explore these values without being subject to a demand to produce output of value to anyone but themselves.
(5) They surround the student, who has recently emerged from the orbit of her parents' authority, with authorities in every subject but no parental substitutes. These authorities-professors, for the most part-are people whose guidance is conditional:
they will help one make way in some domain of value provided that the one devotes oneself in that direction.
By way of these features, and perhaps others, a certain class of educational institutionscolleges and universities-make it possible to begin your aspirational path towards, e.g., philosophy or classics, before you have any sense of the relevant values as possible targets for aspiration.
the intended contrast is with a complex form of reductionism, or whether Scheffler eschews reductionism altogether. I believe that Scheffler's rich conception of valuing corresponds better with the latter position, which is in any case the one I adopt. For just as we deny that someone who merely believes music valuable values it if he is affectively and motivationally indifferent to it, and we deny that someone values an activity he takes pleasure in but disapproves of, we also do not want to call someone a valuer when she judges valuable in the manner of the first and takes pleasure in the manner of the second.
In the valuer, the various pro-attitudes are mutually informative: my understanding of why, e.g., the painting is valuable is informed by the distinctive pleasures I take in features of its composition. Valuing in this richer sense is not merely a combination of attitudes, but a unified complex that represents a higher level of organization of the self from that of the attitudes themselves.
viii Ibid. ch. 6, [4] [5] ix Joseph Raz, "When we are ourselves: the active and the passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 71, (1997).
x Because I want to reserve the category of self-transformation for changes to the self that are the proper target of agency, I am setting aside cases in which some attitudinal change is a foreseeable but unintended consequence of what a person does. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such cases share the basic explanatory structure of cases I will call selfcultivation: the agent's willingness to undergo the foreseeable but unintended change will be explainable in terms of her attachment to the value driving her to her primary target.
The change is, in this sense, a response to reasons to be in the changed condition. So, for instance, if I can see that it is a cost of accepting such and such a job that I will become 34 jaded and cynical, I will move forward only if, e.g., I take that cost to be outweighed by the good I can do. 
